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 On March 29, 2001, a Coweta County, Georgia deputy 
clocked Victor Harris’ vehicle at 73 miles-per-hour in a 55 
mile-per-hour zone.1 The deputy activated his blue lights, but 
Harris continued driving.2 The deputy pursued, and Harris 
fled at speeds between 70 and 90 miles per hour. During the 
pursuit, Harris “stayed in control of his vehicle, utilizing his 
blinkers while passing or making turning movements.”3 
Deputy Timothy Scott joined the pursuit.4 Harris entered 
Peachtree City, slowed down, “activated his blinker, and 
turned into a drugstore parking lot located in a shopping 
complex . . . [where] Scott proceeded around the opposite side 
of the complex in an attempt to prevent Harris from leaving 
the parking lot.5 Harris attempted to avoid hitting Scott’s 
 
* J.D., Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law, 
December 2020 
1 Harris v. Coweta Cty., 406 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005). 
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Id. 




car, but the two vehicles “came in contact with each other, 
causing minor damage to Scott’s cruiser.” Harris entered the 
highway and continued his flight.6 
Despite having no training in the technique, Scott 
requested permission to perform the “PIT maneuver” 
(Precision Immobilization Technique). Scott’s supervisor 
gave him permission to do so with no knowledge of the 
justification for the pursuit, no knowledge of the speeds 
involved, and no knowledge of the number of vehicles or 
pedestrians on the roadway.7 Scott then determined that he 
“could not perform the PIT maneuver because he was going 
too fast.”8 Instead he “rammed his cruiser directly into 
Harris’ vehicle, causing Harris to lose control, leave the 
roadway, run down an embankment, and crash.”9 Harris 
sustained serious injuries, rendering him a quadriplegic.10 
Harris brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation 
of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
seizure (i.e. excessive force) “under color of law” against 
Deputy Scott and others.11 Scott responded by moving for 
dismissal of Harris’ complaint for failure to state a claim as 
a matter of law pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.12 Scott based this motion on the qualified 
immunity doctrine, which provides immunity to claims of 
excessive force when the officer has a reasonable, good faith 
belief that the force at issue was permissible.13 The Federal 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the 
grant of qualified immunity for both Scott and his 
supervisor.14 Under procedure permitted for denials of 
qualified immunity, Scott entered an interlocutory appeal on 
 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 1311-12.  
8 Id. at 1312. 
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
11 Id. at 1313.  
12 Id. at 1310-12.  
13 See David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Defense of good faith in 
action for damages against law enforcement official under 42 
U.S.C.A § 1983, providing for liability of person who, under the 
color of law, subjects another to deprivation of rights, 61 A.L.R. 
Fed. 7. 
14 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 (2007).  
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the issue of qualified immunity.15 The Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals reviewed the written record, then affirmed 
the denial as to Scott, but reversed the denial (i.e. effectively 
granting) as to his supervisor.16 It appears that the case was 
going to trial, except that the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on Deputy Scott’s interlocutory appeal.17  
 In the opinion that followed, Justice Antonin Scalia 
gave an excoriating opinion admonishing the Eleventh 
Circuit and granting Deputy Scott’s motion for summary 
judgment based on qualified immunity.18 In doing so, Justice 
Scalia stated, “We have little difficulty in concluding it was 
reasonable for Scott to take the action that he did.”19 What 
can explain this glaring difference in the conclusions (and 
underlying analyses) of the District, Circuit, and Supreme 
Court? 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.”20 This single, deceptively simple sentence 
actually consists of three important components: (1) the right 
of citizens to be secure in their “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects”; (2) against unreasonable searches and seizures (i.e. 
the reasonableness requirement); and (3) a requirement that 
warrants be “based on probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation.”21 The following is focused on the second 
component – the requirement of reasonableness – as it 
relates to the use of force by the police. 
 The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to 
apply to a law enforcement officer’s use of force against an 
individual (e.g. grabbing, tasing, spraying, striking, 
strangling, shooting) – a seizure under the Amendment.22 
 
15 See Harris v. Coweta Cty., 406 F.3d at 1321. 
16 Id. 
17 Scott v. Harris, 549 U.S. 991 (2006). 
18 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 386.  
19 Id. at 384. 
20 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
21 See id. 
22 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 




This interpretation brings police use of force under federal 
purview and makes any police use of force, whether by a 
local, state, or federal officer, a potential constitutional 
violation.23 Despite this, police officers are privileged to use 
such force without violating the U.S. Constitution, so long as 
that force is reasonable when considered against the 
circumstances in which it was applied.24 The application of 
the privilege to use force hinges on a determination of 
reasonableness by the court.25 But what is a reasonable use 
of force? That which may appear reasonable to some might 
be unreasonable to others. By what standard do we judge 
reasonableness? Should we consider the police officer’s 
intent? Perhaps we should consider what the proverbial 
reasonable person would do? Is it even possible to know? 
 Defining reasonableness has proven difficult. No 
constitutional provision, statute, rule, doctrine, or judicial 
decision has been shown to adequately formulate a simple 
test that accounts for the myriad of circumstances that police 
may encounter. The current rules, discussed below, are in a 
constant state of flux. Courts vary in their interpretations. 
Contradictory doctrines are developed among the various 
Circuits and uncertainty abounds. This is to say nothing of 
the various state approaches. As a result, law enforcement 
agents, agencies, and the public are left largely in the dark 
as to when and how much force is legally permissible.26 
Added to this milieu of misunderstanding is a much-
maligned and equally misunderstood qualified immunity 
doctrine. Most law enforcement use of force jurisprudence is 
drawn from summary proceedings – the grant or denial of 
qualified immunity – typically held in the course of a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 action.27 Qualified immunity is a defense 
generally available to governmental actors engaged in their 
respective discretionary functions and is generally offered in 
 
23 See id. 
24 See id. at 392-99. 
25 Id. 
26 Matthew McNamara, Legal Corner: Departmental Liability for 
Failure-to-Train, POLICE1 (August 1, 2006), 
https://www.police1.com/legal/articles/legal-corner-
departmental-liability-for-failure-to-train-2u9f7FahaUF5Hcrr/. 
27 See 88 A.L.R. 2d 1330. 
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support of a summary judgment motion (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56).28 
The doctrine is a recognized exception to our general legal 
formula of allowing a jury to make factual determinations.29 
As applied to law enforcement in the use of force context, the 
defense permits the summary dismissal of excessive force 
allegations based on the officer’s reasonable, good faith belief 
that the force at issue was permissible.30 Unfortunately, the 
summary standards at issue are antiquated, at best. In such 
summary proceedings, courts make very limited factual 
inquiries and accept the facts “in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party” (i.e. the non-law enforcement 
plaintiff), no matter how “rash and improbable” they 
appear.31 Thus, the “facts” presented are often just the 
plaintiff’s version of the events. As a result, the doctrine 
allows patently false claims to proceed to trial, irrespective 
of compelling evidence of their falsity.  
Conversely, perhaps to compensate for this otherwise 
plaintiff-friendly approach, the qualified immunity doctrine 
requires that all claims be “well established.”32 As if to 
ensure that neither plaintiff nor defendant could reasonably 
expect a rational proceeding, pursuant to a recent change in 
procedural jurisprudence, judges may choose to forego any 
inquiry into the reasonableness of the force at issue. This 
procedural change thus allows judges to avoid their 
constitutional imperative to establish the precedent that 
plaintiffs, officers, agencies, and the public rely upon as 
guidance in determining what is reasonable force.33 Recent 
empirical evidence indicates that this change in use of force 
procedural law disincentives an objective analysis of the use 
of force itself, while encouraging over-reliance on the “well 
established” requirement - resulting in the dismissal of 
 
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see WHITNEY K. NOVAK, POLICING THE 
POLICE: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
CONGRESS, 1 (Cong. Res. Serv. 2020); see also 3 Civil Rights 
Actions P 10.03 (2020). 
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 38. 
30 See 61 A.L.R. Fed. 7; see also Novak, supra note 28 at 1.  
31 See 45 A.L.R. Fed. 864. 
32 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 572 (1985); Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
33 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 




otherwise meritorious claims of excessive force.34 As fewer 
substantive rulings are issued, the public and law 
enforcement agencies and officers are left largely in the dark 
as to the appropriate standard.35  
In the void left by this lack of a consistent statement 
on the permissible use of force, the public’s suspicion of law 
enforcement and government in general grows.36 
Increasingly, this distrust plays out in America’s streets, 
businesses, and homes. Resistance to legitimate authority is 
on the rise – ironically and sadly resulting an increase in use 
of force incidents.37 And yet, this need not be the case. In this 
modern age of vehicle-mounted and body-worn cameras, 
public and private video surveillance systems, and 
omnipresent cellular telephones with video-recording 
capabilities, it is now possible to review many police use of 
force incidents, in slow motion and frame by frame if 
necessary. These recordings now make up a part of the 
evidentiary record available for review in summary 
proceedings.38 Despite this ability, some judges reviewing 
the evidentiary record decline to take full advantage of the 
possibilities afforded by such recordings and the extent to 
 
34 See e.g. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in 
Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120 (2009). 
35 See Daphne Duret and Jessica Priest, Police training cited as 
defense in many use of force cases. But experts say it's outdated, 
USA TODAY, (Sept. 22, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2020/09/22/p
olice-use-force-cases-cite-training-defense-its-
outdated/5861668002/.; see also Tim Dees, 15 things cops wish 




36 See e.g. Farah Stockman, ‘They Have Lost Control’ Why 
Minneapolis Burned, N.Y. TIMES, (July 13, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/us/minneapolis-government-
george-floyd.html. 
37 See e.g. Bill Hutchison, Police officers killed surge 28% this year 
and some point to civil unrest and those looking to exploit it, ABC 
NEWS,(July 22, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/US/police-officers-
killed-surge-28-year-point-civil/story?id=71773405 
38 See U.S.C.S. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-
81. 
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which courts may rely on such evidence is in question.39 The 
difficulties described above have been recognized by others, 
and no small amount of legal scholarship has been dedicated 
to identifying some of the problems with modern use of force 
jurisprudence, arguing for radical change, or offering some 
significant alternative.40 Rather than any of these, this 
article simply aims to inform the discussion and offers some 
practical changes aimed at reconciling use of force 
procedural law with modern reality. It attempts to inform 
the debate and simplify what is, admittedly, a rather 
complex concept. 
The following work focuses on the category of force 
recognized by most of the American public - the force 
employed by uniformed officers upon free citizens during the 
course of the officers’ regular duties. This article will focus 
on federal jurisprudence, in order to provide the broadest, 
most accurate, and most applicable information. Ultimately, 
any serious research into police use of force must confront 
the reasonableness inquiry – which is always at issue in the 
use of force analysis. It is at issue in reviewing the 
application of force itself – in establishing a constitutional 
violation - and it becomes central in any resultant Section 
1983 Action and qualified immunity defense. This inquiry is 
presented by detailing the modern history of use of force 
jurisprudence, presented by three seminal cases (the 
substantive law). That history continues to the present as 
courts grapple with new technology and techniques – 
creating novel questions of law and requiring a continual 
readdressing and refining of the reasonableness standard. 
The following section describes some major aspects of use of 
force litigation (the procedural law) – namely the Section 
1983 action and the qualified immunity doctrine. The 
substantive and procedural foundation established, the next 
section identifies and establishes some problems with the 
current legal standard. Finally, this work will use a short 
case study to address the major question posed by this 
 
39 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-81; see also Jack B. Weinstein, The 
Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes 
for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 122-
25 (2008). 
40 See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell's Vision: Video and 
the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 607-
10 (2009). 




introduction and demonstrate the effects of the two-step 
objective reasonableness inquiry and use of judicial video 
review on summary judgment proceedings. 
 
II. HISTORY OF USE OF FORCE JURISPRUDENCE (THE 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW) 
 
 The history of use of force jurisprudence is less than 
straight-forward. Rather, our current understanding of 
police use of force has evolved, beginning in the 1970s, and 
continuing to the present. In fact, it was not immediately 
apparent to the courts that police use of force would be 
governed by the Fourth Amendment, let alone what 
standard would be applied to ensure the Amendment’s 
guarantee of reasonableness.41 Below are three seminal 
cases that illustrate the court’s evolution and eventual 
adoption of an objective reasonableness standard under the 
Fourth Amendment.42  
 
A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS TEST - JOHNSON V. 
GLICK 
 
  Johnson v. Glick was an early attempt by the court 
to establish a framework for analyzing law enforcement use 
of force. Glick illustrates the struggle pre-Connor courts had 
in developing the constitutional framework by which law 
enforcement use of force could be judged. In Glick, the 
plaintiff brought an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.43 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered and 
rejected application of the Eighth and Fourth Amendments 
to an incident of alleged excessive force involving a 
correctional officer and a pre-trial detainee.44 Ultimately, the 
court found that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the 
Eighth Amendment apply to the facts alleged.45 The court 
instead found that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee 
of due process of law prohibited the behavior alleged.46 Glick 
 
41 See discussion infra, Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.  
42 See generally Graham, 490 U.S. at 392-397. 
43 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029 (2d Cir. 1973). 
44 See id. 
45 Id. at 1032. 
46 Id.  
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illustrates the courts use of various factors in weighing the 
competing governmental and individual interests, “In 
determining whether the constitutional line has been 
crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the 
application of force, the relationship between the need and 
the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury 
inflicted . . . .”47 Of note, the court found a mens rea 
requirement applicable to such an allegation of violation of 
due process of law, “whether force was applied in a good faith 
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,”48 a 
consideration which, oddly, the Supreme Court would reject 
in Graham v. Connor.49 Later cases would also find the 
Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth, as the 
source of the Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable 
force.50 Glick endures, however, in the court’s continued 
consideration of competing interests in its inquiry into the 
reasonableness of law enforcement use of force.51 
 
B. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES - TENNESSEE V. 
GARNER 
 
In a landmark use of force decision in 1985, the Court 
determined that the common law “fleeing felon rule,” as 
enacted in Tennessee statute, was an unconstitutional 
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against 
unreasonable seizure.52 On October 3, 1974, Memphis Police 
Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright were dispatched to 
a prowler call.53 A witness informed them that she heard 
glass breaking and that someone was inside an adjacent 
house.54 Officer Hymon went behind the house where he 
heard a door slam and saw the suspect run across the 
backyard.55 The fleeing suspect, later identified as 16-year-
 
47 Id. at 1033. 
48 Id.  
49 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
50 See Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1985); Graham, 490 
U.S. at 397. 
51 Garner, 471 U.S. at 9; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
52 Garner, 471 U.S. at 20-21. 
53 Id. at 3.  
54 Id. 
55 Id.  




old Edward Garner, stopped at a chain-link fence at the edge 
of the yard.56 Officer Hymon called out, “police, halt” and took 
a few steps toward Garner, who began to climb over the 
fence.57 To prevent Garner’s escape from a felony 
(aggravated burglary), Hymon fired one shot at the teen, 
striking him in the back of the head.58 Edward Garner died 
shortly thereafter.59 There was no indication that Garner 
was armed during the encounter.60 Officer Hymon, in firing 
on the unarmed teen, was acting under the authority 
accorded to him at the time by Tennessee Code, which 
provided that “If, after notice of the intention to arrest the 
defendant, [the defendant] either flee or forcibly resist, the 
officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.”61 
  After addressing several issues at the district court 
and court of appeals, including the question of Officer 
Hymon’s qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit found the 
statute at issue permitted an unreasonable (and thus 
unconstitutional) seizure under the Fourth Amendment.62 
Thereupon, the state of Tennessee intervened and appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
agreed with the Circuit Court but found only that the statute 
at issue was unconstitutional in its application (perhaps out 
of respect for federalism and separation of powers).63 The 
high court engaged in a Fourth Amendment interest 
balancing test, weighing the defendant’s “fundamental 
interest in his own life” against the government’s interest in 
effective law enforcement (e.g. reduced violence by 
encouraging the individual to submit to arrest rather than 
flee).64 The court found that the individual’s interest 
outweighed the government’s interest, and that the use of 
deadly force actually frustrated society’s interest in seeing a 
“judicial determination of guilt and punishment.”65 In doing 
so, the Court laid down the seminal rule regarding the use of 
 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 4. 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. 
61 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982). 
62 Garner, 471 U.S. at 20-21. 
63 Id. at 25. 
64 Id. at 9. 
65 Id. 
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deadly force by law enforcement. That rule requires that 
deadly force may be used to prevent escape only: 
 
Where the officer has probable cause to believe 
that the suspect poses a threat of serious 
physical harm, either to the officer or to others 
. . . . [t]hus, if the suspect threatens the officer 
with a weapon or there is probable cause to 
believe that he has committed a crime 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction 
of serious physical harm, deadly force may be 
used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, 
where feasible, some warning has been 
given.66  
 
 This decision established a rule which still stands and 
prompted a statutory change in Tennessee.67 As later cases 
will show, the court’s balancing of the government’s interest 
against the individual’s interest against unreasonable 
seizure will continue to be an important consideration.68 
While the Court in Garner employed the Fourth Amendment 
as the source of the substantive right not to be shot while 
fleeing a non-violent felony, the case did not definitively state 
that the Fourth Amendment was the primary source of 
substantive rights in non-deadly use of force cases.69 Beyond 
identifying the Fourth Amendment as the font for this 
substantive right, the case also reaffirmed the “totality of the 
circumstances” standard to be considered in the analysis of 
reasonableness.70 The Supreme Court would not be long in 
providing a more definitive, but complex, framework for 
analyzing police use of force – one which retained the 
“totality of the circumstances” concept. 
 
 
66 Id. at 11-12. 
67 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (2020); see also 1985 Tenn. 
Pub. Acts 359, § 1; 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 980, § 19 (abrogating 
Tennessee’s fleeing felon statute); compar. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
7-108 (1984). 
68 See, e.g., Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-99. 
69 Garner, 471 U.S. at 20-22.  
70 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 




C. OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS TEST - GRAHAM V. 
CONNOR 
 
Clearly, courts have struggled to define the rights 
enjoyed by free citizens when encountering police and 
struggled with the best means to uphold those rights. The 
courts had successfully established a workable framework 
for evaluating deadly force incidents, having found 
Tennessee’s “fleeing felon” statute invalid in its 
application.71 But what of non-deadly force (which makes up 
the great bulk of use of force incidents involving law 
enforcement)?72 To address this lack of a legal framework, 
the Supreme Court crafted a rule that has stood since its 
announcement in 1989. The profound effect of that rule 
cannot be overstated, and the case itself has been cited over 
54,000 times and has been the subject of nearly 1,200 law 
review articles.73 Simply put, it is the foundation of the civil 
legal system’s modern understanding of police use of force. 
In 1984, Dethorne Graham, a severe diabetic, began 
to feel the onset of a diabetic “sugar reaction.”74 A friend, 
William Berry, drove him to a Charlotte, North Carolina 
convenience store to purchase some orange juice to stave off 
the reaction.75 Graham entered the store, but upon seeing 
the long line of customers waiting to check out, hurriedly 
exited the store without making a purchase.76 Graham and 
Berry left, intent on reaching Berry’s residence.77 Connor, a 
Charlotte Police Department officer, saw Graham hastily 
enter and leave the store.78 Connor became suspicious, 
followed Berry’s car as it pulled away from the store, then 
 
71 See Garner, 471 U.S. at 20-22. 
72 See SHELLEY S. HYLAND ET AL., POLICE USE OF NONFATAL 
FORCE, 2002-11, 9 (Bureau of Just. Stats. 2015). 
73 Lance J. LoRusso, Graham v. Connor: Three decades of 




74 Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 388-89. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 389. 
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made an investigative traffic stop.79 During that stop, 
Connor “ordered Berry and Graham to wait while he found 
out what, if anything, had happened at the convenience 
store.”80 When Officer Connor returned to his patrol car to 
call for backup assistance, Graham got out of the car, ran 
around it twice, and finally sat down on the curb, where he 
passed out briefly due to a diabetic reaction.”81 
         Unfortunately, responding backup officers 
mistook Graham’s symptoms for alcohol intoxication.82 
These symptoms are quite similar.83 Graham was 
handcuffed and placed face-down on Berry’s car.84 During 
this ordeal, Berry and Graham repeatedly informed officers 
that Graham was diabetic, but they were ignored.85 Graham 
was thrown headfirst into a police car.86 During the struggle 
with officers, Graham sustained some minor injuries and a 
broken foot.87 Shortly thereafter, Connor learned that 
Graham had not committed any crime inside the convenience 
store. Graham was driven home and released.88 
  Graham initiated a §1983 action against the involved 
officers, claiming excessive use of force during the encounter 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.89 The United 
States District Court for the Western District of North 
Carolina directed the verdict for Connor and the other 
officers, finding that the force used by officers “was not 
applied maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of 
causing harm,” but rather in a “good faith effort to maintain 
or restore order in the face of a potentially explosive 
situation” (the standard applied in Glick).90 The Fourth 
 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Arthur Hsieh, Drunk Versus Diabetes: How Can You Tell?, 
EMS1 (July 7, 2020) https://www.ems1.com/ems-
products/ambulance-disposable-supplies/articles/drunk-versus-
diabetes-how-can-you-tell-IPqqk8mtnAjBmJFv/ 
84 Graham, 490 U.S. at 389.  
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 390.  
88 Id. at 389.  
89 Id. at 390. 
90 Id. at 390-91. 




Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari,91 reversed the District 
and Circuit, and established the objective reasonableness 
analytical framework of the Fourth Amendment that is still 
in effect.92  
  In the following opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
perhaps grasping the enormity of the shift he was 
instituting, gave a rather detailed and justified exposition of 
the objective reasonableness test that attempts to provide 
consistency and certainty while advancing some legal 
novelties.93 Rehnquist positively affirmed that the test of 
reasonableness for a law enforcement officer’s use of force 
“must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer 
on the scene.”94 This was a departure from the traditional 
and recognizable reasonable person standard and sparked no 
small amount of controversy.95  
The Chief Justice also took the opportunity to clarify 
what the standard was not. Rehnquist completely 
disregarded the subjective intent component of the Glick 
Fourteenth Amendment analysis, stating, “An officer’s evil 
intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out 
of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s 
good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of 
force constitutional.”96 The Chief Justice disregarded the 
Glick Due Process Right to be free of excessive force, instead 
finding the right at issue under the more-firmly rooted 
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable 
seizure,  
 
Where, as here, the excessive force claim 
arises in the context of an arrest or 
investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most 
properly characterized as one invoking the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment, which 
guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in 
 
91 Id. at 391-92.  
92 Id. at 397-99. 
93 See id. at 392-99. 
94 Id. at 395 (emphasis added). 
95 See LoRusso, supra note 73.   
96 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 
U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). 
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their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . 
seizures . . . . ”97 
 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion went still further in 
blurring the analytical distinction between deadly and non-
deadly force, proclaiming that all claims “that law 
enforcement officers have used excessive force - deadly or not 
- in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 
‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than 
under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.”98  
  In rejecting the subjective intent of the officer and 
the reasonable person standard, the Court substituted 
several factors to be considered in evaluating the 
reasonableness of a law enforcement officer’s use of force. 
These factors include: “[1] the severity of the crime at issue, 
[2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the 
safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether [the suspect] 
is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight.”99 In establishing this three-pronged test the Court 
built upon the totality of the circumstances approach 
employed in Tennessee v. Garner.100 
 Frustratingly, the Court did not establish the kind of 
bright-line rule that observers might have hoped for. 
Instead, the Court found that the test of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness is incapable of precise definition, but 
required “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of 
each particular case.”101 Given the fact-specific, 
individualized rule the court was crafting, it is no surprise 
that Chief Justice Rehnquist provided lower courts with an 
“interpretive lens” through which to evaluate use of force 
cases.102 The court warned that the reasonableness of a law 
enforcement officer’s particular use of force “must be judged 
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 
 
97 Id. at 394. 
98 Id. at 395. 
99 Id. at 396 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9). 
100 See Garner, 471 U.S. at 9. 
101 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
559 (1979)). 
102RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, POLICE USE OF FORCE: RULES, 
REMEDIES, AND REFORMS 5 (Cong. Res. Cent., 2015). 




rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”103 In case 
there was still a question about the latitude courts were to 
allow officers, Chief Justice Rehnquist posited, “The calculus 
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that 
police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving - about the amount of force that is necessary 
in a particular situation.”104 Subsequent courts have 
struggled to uniformly apply the standard created in Connor 
to the myriad of circumstances surrounding use of force 
incidents. 
 
III. REFINING REASONABLENESS  
 
Since the establishment of the objective 
reasonableness standard, judges and justices have 
attempted to refine the standard to adequately account for 
the myriad of circumstances that officers confront. 
Reviewing courts confront novel questions of law brought by 
changes in law enforcement equipment and techniques. This 
should not come as a surprise, as use of force jurisprudence 
is, by its nature, reactive to such changes. Courts operate to 
restrict particular types and amounts of force as they are 
confronted with them, case by case, rather than proscribing 
the types and amounts of force permitted.105 These courts 
have adapted the objective reasonableness standard, 
identifying new and more precise factors to be considered, 
and elaborating upon the three prongs of Graham v. Connor, 
while applying the interpretive lens of the reasonable officer 
on the scene.106 In so doing, the courts established new 
precedent which later courts built upon. The courts employ 
the totality of the circumstances concept to describe the 
circumstances against which the officer’s use of force is to be 
judged. That concept has been interpreted to describe a 
multitude of individual factors as applied to the use of force, 
including: “the need for the application of force” and its 
 
103 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (emphasis added). 
104 Id.  
105 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 45 (6th ed. 2019). 
106 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
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“relationship to the amount of force used,”107 the extent of 
any resultant injury,108 and “whether the force was applied 
in good faith or maliciously and sadistically.”109 The Third 
Circuit, in Sharrar v. Felsing, identified several additional 
factors: “the possibility that the persons subject to the police 
action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of 
the action, whether the action takes place in the context of 
effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be 
armed, and the number of persons with whom the police 
officers must contend at one time.”110 As one might imagine, 
this multitude of factors (itself not exhaustive) in no way 
simplified the objective reasonableness analysis. Rather, the 
courts have repeatedly cautioned that each use of force 
encounter requires a fact-based, case-by-case analysis.111  
One aspect of this refining process has been the 
recognition of reasonable mistakes of fact. The courts have 
repeatedly affirmed that officers in the line of duty are to be 
granted appropriate leeway; reasonable mistakes are to be 
permitted.112 A reasonable mistake can even rise to the use 
of deadly force without constituting a Fourth Amendment 
violation.113 This is not surprising, given that the force used 
by an officer is supposed to be evaluated from the officer's 
perspective, without the benefit of hindsight “in recognition 
of the fact that officers cannot be expected to respond to 
information they did not possess at the time they acted.”114 
The permissible mistakes most often relate to reasonable 
mistakes of fact, not law. Thus, where the facts as reasonably 
believed (or perceived) by the officer would have justified the 
use of deadly force, the use of such force, even when the 
officer was mistaken as to those facts, may still be justified. 
Examples include officer’s shooting of a person after 
 
107 Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1170 n.18 (11th Cir. 2000). 
108 Id. 
109 Moore v. Gwinnett Cty., 967 F.2d 1495, 1498 (11th 
Cir.1992) (quoting Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th 
Cir.1986)). 
110 Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997). 
111 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 383. 
112 Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157, 165 (4th Cir. 2001). 
113 Culosi v. Bullock, 596 F.3d 195, 200-01 (4th Cir. 2010). 
114 Melgar ex rel. Melgar v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 
2010). 




mistakenly perceiving him or her brandishing a firearm,115 
or shooting a fleeing driver where the officer reasonably but 
mistakenly believed the driver backed over another officer.116 
But, how is this substantive law actually applied? 
 
IV.  PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF USE OF FORCE LITIGATION 
 
In the United States, the individual’s constitutional 
protection against unreasonable or excessive force by police 
is found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.117 No discussion of this federal constitutional 
protection against such force would be complete without 
discussing the actual mechanism for enforcing that 
protection. The primary civil action available against the 
individual police officer or agency is the Civil Action for 
Deprivation of Rights, or more commonly the 'Section 1983 
Action', codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.118 As an important 
defense against these § 1983 Actions, law enforcement 
officers and agencies have at their disposal the oft-maligned 
and equally misunderstood qualified immunity doctrine. In 
the realm of excessive force claims, the § 1983 action and 
qualified immunity defense go hand-in-hand. 
 
A. CIVIL ACTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in relevant part:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
 
115 See McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1006-09 (4th Cir. 
1994) 
116 Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2010). 
117 Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. 
118 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (formerly codified 
as 8 U.S.C. § 43). 
186                     8 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2021) 
 
the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding . . . .119  
 
A “person,” under this statute, has been interpreted 
to include local governmental entities, including municipal 
and county governments. 120 Despite this interpretation, § 
1983 does not impose a pure respondeat superior liability; 
rather, the plaintiff in a § 1983 action against the 
government entity must prove the entity’s liability is 
pursuant to some “policy” or “custom” of the entity that 
caused the plaintiff's injury.121  
 To sustain a § 1983 action, under the language of the 
statute, the complaint must allege: “(1) that the conduct 
complained of was engaged in under color of state law, and 
(2) that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to the 
deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by 
the Federal Constitution and laws.”122 Specific to the typical 
law enforcement excessive force claim,123 where there is little 
argument whether the on-duty police officer was acting 
under the color of law, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege 
“an injury that resulted directly and only from an objectively 
unreasonable, excessive use of force.124 Section 1983 does not 
create an independent right of action in and of itself, rather 
it is a vehicle for asserting a violation of another recognized 
right, which may be established under constitutional or 
statutory authority.125 Of course, § 1983 was not the only 
statute enacted to protect the newly-won freedoms of freed 
African Americans. A similar, criminal statute was 
established by the 1866 Civil Rights Act, codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 242.126 Despite the existence of this separate 
statute, § 1983 actions are far more common than § 242 
actions in excessive force claims.127 This is not an accident. 
 
119 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
120 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also 
Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). 
121 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 
U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986). 
122 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 58 (2020). 
123 See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 72 (2020). 
124 See Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 734 (5th Cir. 2013). 
125 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). 
126 American Bar Association Resolution 301A, 12 (August 2020). 
127 Id. 




Prosecution of the civil § 1983 action, at least compared to 
the criminal § 242 action, is much more straight forward. 
Whereas 42 U.S.C. §1983 contains no mens rea requirement 
and the standard of proof is the preponderance of the 
evidence, 18 U.S.C. § 242 has been interpreted to contain a 
mens rea element and requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.128 Importantly, as § 1983 is a civil action, damage 
awards (sometimes rather large) are also at stake. 
 
B. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
 
To defend against claims of excessive force, 
individuals and governmental entities may assert the 
defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a good-
faith defense, analogous to Common Law torts defenses.129 
Qualified immunity differs from a per se good faith defense, 
however, in that the qualifying grantee must demonstrate 
more than a subjective good intention130. Rather, he or she 
must also demonstrate the reasonableness of their belief or 
conduct leading to the use of force.131 Qualified immunity is 
designed to protect government officials who perform 
discretionary functions from civil liability “insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”132 And yet, to classify qualified immunity as a 
defense conveys a misunderstanding of the doctrine, as it is 
less a defense to liability than an immunity from suit.133 As 
such, “it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted 
to go to trial.”134 While the defense must be affirmatively 
asserted, law enforcement officers are generally entitled to 
qualified immunity “when an official’s conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
 
128 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,101-07 (1945); 
compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with 18 U.S.C. § 242. 
129 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557 (“We hold that the defense of good 
faith and probable cause . . . is also available to [law enforcement] 
in the action under § 1983.”). 
130 Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762, 768 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
131 61 A.L.R. Fed. 7. 
132 Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 536 (6th Cir. 
2006) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18). 
133 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
134 Id. 
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of which a reasonable person would have known.”135 The 
defense is most often asserted pursuant to a summary 
judgment motion where, if granted, the defense may obviate 
the need for a trial.136 It may be appropriate for a judge to 
make a determination as to the reasonableness of the 
officer’s conduct at issue on summary judgment motion, 
either granting or denying in whole or in part the motion, as 
the reasonableness of a use of force is a legal determination, 
not a pure question of fact.137 Summary judgment based on 
qualified immunity is granted when the moving party (law 
enforcement defendant) shows that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.138 Courts have emphasized that the 
alleged factual dispute must be both genuine and material.139 
The grant of qualified immunity at this summary stage, as 
in other civil actions, allows the defendant to avoid the time 
and expense of an unnecessary trial.140  
There are strong policy arguments for granting the 
immunity early in the course of litigation, where 
appropriate.141 These arguments include avoidance of any 
“excessive disruption of government” and the “resolution of 
insubstantial claims” by summary judgment.142 Other 
arguments include the safeguarding of government funds, 
preservation of judicial resources, and eliminating any 
disincentive for police officers to carry out their duties.143 In 
accord with these purposes, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving immunity 
questions “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”144 
 
135 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017). 
136 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
137 See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2013). 
138 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 586-587, (1986); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
139 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). 
140 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
141 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526; see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. 
142 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 102 
(2020). 
143 See Philip Sheng, An “Objectively Reasonable” Criticism of the 
Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases Brought 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 99, 100 (2012); see also 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.  
144 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). 




Recognizing that an order to trial irrevocably terminates the 
immunity and defeats these public policy goals, courts 
permit interlocutory appeal for denials of immunity.145 
Despite the policy arguments in support of an early 
grant of qualified immunity, several procedural protections 
are in place and designed to ensure that meritorious claims 
are not unjustifiably dismissed. While the question of the 
reasonableness of an officer’s actions are typically reviewed 
as a question of law, courts, even in summary proceedings, 
typically do not make findings of fact.146 Upon a motion for 
summary judgment, including a motion based on qualified 
immunity, the judge must view the admissible evidence on 
the record “in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party” (the plaintiff).147 This procedural safeguard is 
designed to ensure that no case is dismissed where material 
facts are in dispute, before the trier of fact can weigh the 
evidence through trial. Stated another way, the judge should 
grant the motion only if “no reasonable trier of fact could ever 
find in the opposing party's favor based on the admissible 
evidence in the record.”148 The inquiry is whether the trier of 
fact could find in the plaintiff’s favor, not whether a 
reasonable trier of fact likely would.149 These procedural 
safeguards represent the public policy interest in ensuring 
just relief to an afflicted party. 
When evaluating a claim to qualified immunity, the 
Court’s threshold inquiry is whether the plaintiff's 
allegations, when taken as true, establish a constitutional 
violation.150 If the plaintiff’s allegations do not establish a 
constitutional violation, the inquiry ends.151 If the plaintiff’s 
allegations, taken as true, do establish a constitutional 
violation, the court must then determine whether the right 
at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged 
violation.152 This requirement that the violation be “clearly 
established” serves to ensure that officers are “on notice their 
 
145 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527. 
146 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 
147 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. 
148 McIndoe v. Huntington Ingals, 817 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
149 Id. 
150 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). 
151 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 106 (2020). 
152 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
190                     8 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2021) 
 
conduct is unlawful.”153 Such a standard purports to protect 
officers when they are acting within the “sometimes hazy 
border” between justifiable and excessive force.154 The degree 
of factual similarity required for the right to be “well-
established” varies among the lower courts and among the 
circuits.155 In all circuits, the degree of similarity “must be 
clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it 
to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to 
apply.”156  
 
C. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 
 
In summary, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not establish a 
stand-alone right; the plaintiff must allege a violation of an 
underlying right by the defendant acting “under color of 
law.”157 To establish such a violation, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that a reasonable officer, with the facts known 
to the officer at the time the force was used, without the 
benefit of hindsight, in the given circumstances (totality of 
the circumstances), would have known that the right was 
clearly established.158 This standard, at least on its face, 
permits mistakes so long as they are reasonable.159 In 
practice, the officer’s ultimate liability turns on the objective 
reasonableness of the force employed assessed against the 
clearly established law at the time the force was employed.160 
As should be clear from the language in Graham v. Connor 
and its progeny, and the language employed to describe the 
qualified immunity doctrine, the reasonableness inquiry as 
applied to the use of force at issue and the qualified 
immunity defense is substantially the same inquiry.161 At 
least, that is how the inquiry used to progress. 
Unfortunately, a fairly recent procedural change has 
 
153 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-44 (2009). 
154 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206. 
155 See Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019). 
156 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018). 
157 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
158 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
159 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.  
160 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999); Graham, 490 U.S. 
at 397. 
161 See Sheng, supra note 143, at 108; 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights 
§ 109 (2020). 




introduced some judicial discretion in applying the 
reasonableness inquiry – leading to some unfortunate, 
lasting effects. 
 
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STANDARD 
 
In determining whether the alleged actions violate 
clearly established law, courts employ the same standard 
used in evaluating the use of force itself - the objective 
reasonableness test.162 Like other civil cases, and despite the 
difficulty in compiling accurate nation-wide data, it is 
evident the vast majority of excessive force claims do not end 
in trial.163 Rather, it is by evaluation of the use of force 
analysis performed at the summary judgment stage, as a 
question of law, that law enforcement and entity counsel, 
officials, and trainers develop agency policy and training 
regimes.164 Hence, the importance of the court’s analysis 
regarding the use of force cannot be overstated. 
Unfortunately, this two-step inquiry, once mandatory, has 
recently been abrogated by the Supreme Court. This 
loosening of the Court’s procedural requirements has 
allowed lower courts to avoid difficult constitutional 
questions.165 Coupled with the loosening of the court’s 
constitutional imperative, the increasing use of video review 
by courts, as the availability of such audio and video evidence 
has increased, sparked a reaction among some legal 
academics, who argued against extensive judicial review or 
 
162 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. 
163 See Christina Carrega, Millions in Lawsuit Settlements Are 
Another Hidden Cost of Police Misconduct, Legal Experts Say, 
ABC NEWS, (June 14, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/US/millions-
lawsuit-settlements-hidden-cost-police-misconduct-
legal/story?id=70999540; see also KENNETH ADAMS ET AL., USE OF 
FORCE BY POLICE: OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA 10 
(U.S. Dep't. of Just., Off. of Just. Programs 1999); John Barkai et 
al., A Profile of Settlement, 42 CT. REV. Iss. 3-4, 2-3 (2006). 
164 See Duret and Pri, supra note 35. 
165 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234-35; see also Aaron L. Nielson & 
Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2015). 
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reliance on such evidence.166 The legitimacy of judicial video 
and audio review has been called into question, and the 
degree to which individual judges are taking advantage of 
this evidence varies.167 These two recent developments have 
led to a situation in which courts variably rule only on the 
facts as presented by the plaintiff, to the exclusion of more 
reliable audio-video evidence, or else skip to the “well-
established” prong of the analysis – avoiding the objective 
reasonableness analysis altogether. In either eventuality, 
courts are producing less and less-useful excessive force 
precedence – contrary to the needs of future courts, law 
enforcement, and the public. 
 
A. ELIMINATION OF THE SAUCIER MANDATE 
 
In the 2009 Pearson v. Callahan ruling, in response 
to criticism and complaints from lower courts and other 
interested parties, the Supreme Court held that the 
identification of a constitutional violation, with its necessary 
objective reasonableness test, while often “appropriate,” was 
no longer to be regarded as mandatory.168 This change 
allowed courts to avoid the determination of a constitutional 
violation and skip to the determination of whether the 
purported right was well-established – effectively 
shortcutting the whole objective reasonableness analysis of 
the force at issue.169 Since the elimination of the two-step 
inquiry (Saucier) requirement, many courts have elected to 
forego the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis in 
favor of simply considering whether the alleged excessive 
force violated “clearly established law.”170 This result was 
foreseeable and was actually predicted by a number of legal 
scholars.171 This forgoing of the two-step Saucier analysis 
has produced some troubling results.172 Among them, the 
 
166 See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Mixed Signals on Summary 
Judgment, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1331, 1337-40 (2014). 
167 Compare Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015), with Luna v. 
Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversed and remanded).   
168 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234-35. 
169 See id. at 236.   
170 Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 479-80. 
171 See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 34, at 120. 
172 See How Ziglar v. Abbasi Sheds Light on Qualified-Immunity 
Doctrine, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 883, 890 (2019). 




avoidance of the “knotty constitutional inquiry” has led to 
“constitutional stagnation.”173 This stagnation is perhaps 
more pronounced due to the discretion permitted by 
Callahan. Courts predominantly continue to make legal 
findings regarding the reasonableness of a particular use of 
force in obvious cases.174 In contrast, courts tend to forego 
this discretionary analysis when confronted with the most 
difficult legal questions, a trend which is supported by the 
post-Callahan  empirical data.175 Stated another way, it 
would appear that the discretion afforded by the abrogation 
of the Saucier two-step analysis has resulted in courts 
avoiding the close legal calls – the cases where judicial 
interpretation is needed most.176 As fewer courts undertake 
the reasonableness inquiry in difficult cases, less applicable 
case law is issued by those same courts; later courts then lack 
the necessary precedent to determine whether a right is “well 
established.”177 Constitutional questions are allowed to go 
unanswered because they were unanswered before, This 
foreseeable result has been aptly described as “Section 1983 
meets Catch-22.”178 
 Some of the arguments advanced for abrogating the 
Saucier requirement are legitimate, but these complaints 
pale in comparison to the very real danger of constitutional 
stagnation. Strictly speaking, Saucier did require courts to 
confront a constitutional issue where it might otherwise be 
avoided, running contrary to the court’s long-held policy of 
constitutional avoidance.179 Yet, it’s academic folly, 
bordering on the ridiculous, to argue that courts should 
practice constitutional avoidance when evaluating excessive 
force claims – which are based on the Fourth Amendment to 
 
173 Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 479-80; see Nielson & Walker, supra note 
165, at 4-7. 
174 See Nielson & Walker, supra note 165, at 6. 
175 See id. 
176 See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic 
Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55, 67 (2016).   
177 See Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 464. 
178 Id. at 479-80; see Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). 
179 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936); see also 
Pierre N. Level, Madison Lecture: Judging Under the 
Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1276-77 
(2006). 
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the United States Constitution.180 Also, Saucier did require 
courts to expend judicial resources where it was not strictly 
necessary – at least as to the necessity of the analysis in the 
case before it.181 This argument against the expenditure of 
judicial resources is diminished when the results of foregoing 
the analysis, now supported by a decade of post-Callahan 
cases, is the avoidance of close constitutional questions – the 
cases in which an objective reasonableness analysis is most 
needed.182 The long-term nature of this stagnation – lack of 
precedent compounded further by lack of precedent – is such 
that as this avoidance continues, the void in constitutional 
precedent grows ever wider.  
 But what should the courts do about this unfortunate, 
but rather predictable, result? That answer is simple – 
reinstitute the two-step reasonableness inquiry which was, 
until recently, mandatory under Saucier.183 This return to 
pre-2009 procedural requirements would force courts to 
address the difficult constitutional questions and begin to 
address the widening precedential black hole that has been 
developing since Pearson v. Callahan. Put simply, require 
the courts to fulfill their constitutional duty by evaluating 
the specific use of force incidents presented to them. 
 
B. UNCERTAINTY OF VIDEO REVIEW 
 
Even righting the court’s error in abrogating the two-
step analysis requirement will only return use of force 
jurisprudence to the status quo ante pre-Callahan. It would 
do nothing to update or modernize that jurisprudence which, 
as explained above, was developed in the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
The procedural underpinning of that jurisprudence is 
currently in a state of transition, as the courts and legal 
system grapple with the appropriate place of judicial audio 
 
180 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see David B. Owens, Fourth Amendment 
Remedial Equilibration: A Comment on Herring v. United States 
and Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 563, 583 (2010). 
181 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 387-88 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
182 See Nielson & Walker, supra note 165, at 6. 
183 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 




and video review.184 Judicial decisions since Scott v. Harris 
evidence this struggle, as decisions demonstrate varying 
degrees of reliance on available recorded evidence.185 In 
2007, a major change occurred in procedural jurisprudence 
in this regard. Like many use of force cases, the courts were 
reviewing an alleged excessive force claim under the Fourth 
Amendment, before them on the defendant’s interlocutory 
appeal of the lower court's denial of qualified immunity. 
Unlike the vast majority of these cases, however, this case 
came under the review of the Supreme Court. Since that 
decision, described in detail below, legal commentators and 
some lower courts have taken the Court’s holding as a 
mandate to allow video evidence to “speak for itself,”186 The 
reaction to this perceived mandate was strong and 
immediate. Legal comments and articles flooded the 
discourse, arguing against any reliance on the reviewing 
judge’s perception of the recorded incident.187 Some, perhaps 
due to the lack of empirical data from legal sources, sought 
support from film studies.188 Many of these works raise the 
specter of cognitive bias altering the reviewing judge’s 
perspective of the incident during video review.189 While such 
bias should certainly not be wholly dismissed, concerns over 
such bias should not be afforded such weight as to preclude 
review of evidence as valuable and reliable as audio-visual 
recordings. Rather, recent cases demonstrate that the legal 
system is more than capable of affording video and audio 
evidence its proper weight.190  
Furthermore, any of these commentaries were 
premature, as the bulk of these critical works appear to take 
for granted that the review of such video evidence by judges 
 
184 See, e.g., Denise K. Berry, Snap Judgment: Recognizing the 
Propriety and Pitfalls of Direct Judicial Review of Audiovisual 
Evidence at Summary Judgment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3343, 
3377-80 (2015). 
185 Compare Mullenix, 577 U.S. 7 (2015), with Luna v. Mullenix, 
773 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversed and remanded).   
186 See Wasserman, supra note 166, at 1336-38.  
187 See id.  
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
190 See Mitch Zanoff, Assessing the Impact of Police Body Camera 
Evidence on the Litigation of Excessive Force Cases, 54 GA. L. REV. 
1, 59 (2019). 
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would unjustly work against the plaintiff in civil rights cases. 
Now, more than a decade after the Scott decision, empirical-
based research demonstrates the opposite – the availability 
of audio video evidence for review actually aids the 
meritorious case in overcoming some of the procedural 
hurdles described above.191 The availability and 
admissibility of such evidence bodes well for the excessive 
force plaintiff’s chance of ultimate recovery.192 Given the 
goals of the qualified immunity and the procedural summary 
safeguards designed to counterbalance the doctrine, judges 
and justices should take full advantage of audio and video 
review to afford the procedural justice that interested parties 
should expect in our world of omnipresent recording. Beyond 
implementation in the courtroom, recent research 
demonstrates overall positive outcomes for law enforcement 
and the public when audio and video recording technologies 
are employed by officers on the street.193 Overall, when 
cameras are introduced, use of force incidents go down and 
positive police-citizen encounters go up.194 To align Fourth 
Amendment procedural doctrine with the justified 
expectations of the public,195 and the legitimate needs of law 
enforcement,196 the courts should consider making full use of 
available audio and video graphic evidence on review, 
consistent with the purpose of summary judgment.197 The 
 
191 See id. 
192 See id. at 5; see also Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, An 
Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions 
and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 
525, 556 (2010). 
193 ANTHONY BRAGA ET. AL., THE BENEFITS OF BODY-WORN 
CAMERAS: NEW FINDINGS FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL 
AT THE LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, 50-51 
(U.S. Dep't. of Just., Off. Of Just. Programs 2017). 
194 Id. 
195 See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 40, at 611. 
196 See Kami N. Chavis, Body-Worn Cameras: Exploring the 
Unintentional Consequences of Technological Advances and 
Ensuring a Role for Community Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 985, 102-03 (2016); see also Braga, supra 193, at 50-3.  
197 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee's note (1963 
amendment) (“The very mission of the summary judgment 
procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in 
order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial). 




arguments for and against audio-video review aside, what is 
the effect of such a review in practice?  
 
VI. THE POWER OF VIDEO AND THE MANDATORY TWO-
STEP INQUIRY – SCOTT V. HARRIS 
 
The introduction to this article posed the question of 
what can explain the glaring difference between the 
conclusions and analyses of the District, Circuit, and 
Supreme Court regarding the reasonableness of Deputy 
Timothy Scott’s decision to force Victor Harris’ car off the 
roadway – severely injuring him. The short answer to that 
question – the video. Deputy Scott submitted his “dashcam” 
(dashboard mounted camera) video containing the entirety 
of his involvement in the pursuit and seizure at issue.198 The 
nine justices of the Supreme Court, unlike the judges at the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Northern District 
of Georgia, actually watched the video.199 The eight-to-one 
decision that followed illustrates the power and the utility of 
video evidence in analyzing law enforcement use of force. The 
video review, of course, did not alter the result of the pursuit. 
Deputy Scott did end the pursuit by “applying his push 
bumper to the rear of the vehicle, causing it to leave the road 
and crash.”200 Harris was rendered quadriplegic in the 
ensuing crash.201 Deputy Scott never disputed his actions or 
Harris’ injuries202 What the review of the video did, for the 
Justices, was provide the context against which the objective 
reasonableness of Scott’s actions in using deadly force on a 
fleeing motorist could be judged. 
Justice Scalia begins his analysis by applying the 
tried-and-true two-step Saucier summary judgment 
analysis. In so doing, Justice Scalia recognized the 
importance of the extra judicial step in establishing 
precedent.203 Justice Scalia acknowledged that the two-step 
inquiry contradicted the Court’s usual policy of avoiding 
unnecessary adjudication, but recognized the importance of 
 
198 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. 
199 Id. at 380-81. 
200 Id. at 375. 
201 Id.  
202 See id. at 376.  
203 See id. at 377. 
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the practice as necessary in establishing the precedent that 
would become the basis for future holdings dependent on a 
right’s clear establishment.204 Justice Scalia affirmed that in 
questions of qualified immunity courts must first resolve the 
threshold question: whether or not the facts alleged, “taken 
in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,” 
establish a constitutional violation.205 At this threshold 
inquiry, the Supreme Court’s inquiry took a marked turn 
from the lower courts’ analyses, and the power and utility of 
judicial video review becomes clear. 
Under modern use of force jurisprudence, the 
question of a constitutional violation must be evaluated 
based on the objective reasonableness of the officer’s 
actions.206 This is necessarily a fact-driven analysis.207 Thus, 
it is no surprise that Justice Scalia’s analysis turns to the 
relevant facts. The material facts of the pursuit were 
contested, as Scott and Harris gave wildly different accounts 
of the incident.208 Recognizing that no factual findings had 
been conducted, the Justice, consistent with precedent, 
acknowledged that in such a case courts are required to “view 
the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable” to the non-moving party - usually the plaintiff.209 
At this juncture, however, Justice Scalia’s analysis makes a 
radical departure from those of the lower courts. 
 That departure was prompted by the “added wrinkle” 
of a videotape of the pursuit in the record of the case.210 Here, 
eight of the nine Justices, unlike the judges of the lower 
courts, apparently took the opportunity to view the events as 
they unfolded, at least to the extent possible, from an 
unbiased source.211 The justices found that the dashcam 
video tape “clearly contradict[ed] the version of the story told 
 
204 Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). 
205 Id. 
206 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 392-99. 
207 Id. at 396; Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (“[W]e must still slosh our 
way through the factbound morass of 'reasonableness'”). 
208 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. 
209 Id. at 378 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 
655 (1962)); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
210 Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. 
211 Id. (“There are no allegations or indications that this videotape 
was doctored or altered in any way, nor any contention that what 
it depicts differs from what actually happened.”). 




by respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals.”212 But 
what were the justices to do with this evidence? Should they 
have, as offered by some, ignored the evidence before their 
eyes? Should they have affirmed the lower courts’ denial of 
qualified immunity to Deputy Scott (who, based on the video, 
had done nothing wrong), and allowed the case to proceed to 
a trial or settlement for a plaintiff who was clearly 
misrepresenting the facts of the case? 
No. Instead, Justice Scalia, joined by seven of the 
remaining eight justices, chose to cut to the heart of the Rule 
56 presumption in favor of the plaintiff - that the “facts must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.”213 
Emphasizing this standard, the majority determined that 
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of 
which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no 
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that 
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment.”214 Instead, this Court based its 
determination on the video evidence before them. Based on 
that evidence, the Court found the respondent’s account to 
be “utterly discredited by the record,” and evaluated the facts 
of the case as presented by the dashcam recording, rather 
than simply accepting Harris’ account.215 True to precedent, 
the Court then turned to the inescapable paradigm - the 
objective reasonableness analysis – “in the end we must still 
slosh our way through the factbound [sic] morass of 
‘reasonableness.’”216  
The majority turned to the recurring Fourth 
Amendment balancing of the individual’s interest against 
the government’s interests.217 The Court, again using the 
video evidence at its disposal, identified the “paramount 
government interest in ensuring public safety.”218 The Court 
 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 380 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant 
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”). 
214 Id.  
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). 
218 Scott, 550 U.S. at 383. 
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weighed the risk that Harris' actions posed to the public 
(governmental interest) against the threat that Scott’s 
actions posed to Harris (individual’s interest). The court 
found that “it is clear from the videotape that respondent 
[Harris] posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of 
any pedestrians who might have been present, to other 
civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase,” 
while recognizing that Scott’s actions “posed a high 
likelihood of serious injury or death” to Harris.219 To resolve 
this less-than-obvious balance of competing interests, 
Justice Scalia found it “appropriate” to consider more than 
the number of lives at risked, but also Scott’s and Harris’ 
relative culpability.220 With this consideration and the video 
evidence before them, the Court’s conclusion was 
predictable. The majority found that Harris’ actions 
“produced the choice between two evils that Scott 
confronted,” citing: (1) Harris’ choice to engage in and 
continue his “reckless, high-speed flight;” (2) which 
continued over the course of nearly ten miles; and (3) his 
placing innocent motorists and pedestrians in imminent 
danger of death or serious injury. 221 Rejecting the plaintiff’s 
now-discredited claim of being a “cautious and controlled 
driver” over the course of the pursuit, Justice Scalia 
characterized the plaintiff’s flight as something resembling 
“a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort.”222 
Based on this balancing of interests, and considering Harris’ 
own culpability, the Court had “little difficulty” in 
determining that Scott’s decision to force Harris off the 
roadway to end the pursuit was reasonable.223 Finding 
Deputy Scott’s actions objectively reasonable, the Supreme 
Court reversed the lower courts and granted Deputy Scott’s 
motion for summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity.224  
 Scott is an excellent example of the power of video. 
One aspect of that power is the ability of video to place the 
reviewing court, at least to some extent, “in the shoes” of the 
officer in a way that a police report, affidavit, deposition, or 
 
219 Id. at 385. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 384. 
222 Id. at 380. 
223 Id. at 384 
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even trial testimony simply cannot. That ability is on display 
in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, but is even more 
apparent in Justice Breyer’s concurrence, wherein the 
Justice unequivocally stated, “Because watching the video 
footage of the car chase made a difference to my own view of 
the case, I suggest that the interested reader take advantage 
of the link in the Court's opinion . . . and watch it.”225 Having 
done so, Justice Breyer also found that no reasonable jury 
could find that the deputy violated the Constitution.226 That 
same ability allows the reviewer to see and appreciate what 
the officer sees –the defendant/plaintiff’s culpability. It is 
perhaps this element that ultimately tipped the balance in 
Deputy Scott’s favor as, based on the majority’s opinion, 
Harris’ culpability was their final consideration before 




Yet, this impact of the video aside, it is important to 
note that Scott did not create a real change in legal 
precedent, nor did the Court rely on some novel legal 
analysis to arrive at the conclusion that Deputy Scott acted 
reasonably.228 Conversely, the Court relied on the well-
established objective reasonableness test established in 
Graham v. Connor.229 Justice Scalia even rejected plaintiff’s 
attempt to craft a new rule, “Garner did not establish a 
magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions 
whenever an officer's actions constitute ‘deadly force,’”230 
finding, as previous courts had, that law enforcement use of 
force, even deadly force, is to be analyzed under the 
reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment.231  
The holding in Scott provided a much-needed degree 
of certainty to the lower courts, law enforcement, and the 
public. The Court did so by applying the Saucier two-step 
reasonableness inquiry, and by taking full advantage of the 
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unbiased evidence available to it, rather than eschewing the 
opportunity to review the video.232 As video recording 
technology continues to be implemented by law enforcement 
agencies across the country, the resultant empirical data 
supports that the judicial review of captured video and audio 
has a desirable effect – genuine claims of excessive force are 
proven in higher numbers while fraudulent claims are 
dismissed earlier in the course of litigation. In this way, 
video review furthers the goals of the qualified immunity 
doctrine while aiding the meritorious plaintiff in overcoming 
some of its procedural barriers to recovery. Finally, in some 
circumstances, video review allows the courts to establish 
factual elements which would otherwise be unknown and 
unknowable. As a result, these reviewing courts can 
establish and refine excessive force jurisprudence in a 
meaningful way – based on the events that actually occur, 
untainted by the bias of the interested parties, while 
continuing to apply the same well-established objective 
reasonableness standard. Given the possibilities afforded 
when video review is available, the now-evident negative 
consequences of Callahan’s abrogation of the once-
mandatory two-step reasonableness inquiry, the 
consequential dearth of meaningful excessive force case law, 
and the resultant uncertainty among lower courts, law 
enforcement, and the public, it becomes obvious that the 
Saucier mandatory two-step reasonableness analysis should 
be reinstituted. The courts should do what society needs and 
expects them to do, rule on important constitutional 
questions and provide the guidance that future courts, law 
enforcement, and the public require. Finally, in the spirit of 
Scott, it is appropriate to include a link to the infamous video 
so that the interested reader (or watcher) might judge 




232 If anything can truly be said to be “mandatory” for the 
Supreme Court. 
233 Scott v Harris (USSC 05-1631) Pursuit Video, YOUTUBE (Sept. 
3, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrVKSgRZ2GY. 
